
























































www.economics.unimelb.edu.au Consolidation and Price Discrimination





This paper measures the impact of consolidation on cable television prices, product quality,
proﬁts and consumer welfare. I estimate a multi-product monopoly model using panel data on
cable menus and costs in Canada from 1990 to 1996. Using counterfactual simulations, I ﬁnd
mean consumer welfare rises with acquisitions, as does welfare inequality across consumers. Scale
economies are the primary driver of consolidation eﬀects quantitatively, with ﬁrm heterogeneity
in demand and costs having a smaller impact. Regional consolidation yields non-negligible wel-
fare gains, particularly in rural markets where potential cable quality improvements and cost
reductions are the largest.
Keywords: Consolidation; Price Discrimination; Economies of Scale; Firm Heterogeneity;
Simulated Method of Moments; Cable Television
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In the past 30 years, the cable television industries of various industrialized nations have experienced
consolidation.1 The story is similar in many countries: from an industry consisting of many smaller
locally-owned cable operators in the late 1970’s emerges an industry dominated by fewer, larger
ﬁrms in the 2000’s, with the large ﬁrms’ expansion largely driven by the acquisition of smaller cable
companies over time. Although these histories have been well-documented by industry experts,
various open questions remain (Crawford (2009)). What eﬀect do acquisitions have on cable prices,
product quality and proﬁts? To what extent do scale economies or unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors
such as branding or managerial diﬀerences persist as factors that drive consolidation? To what
degree are consumers made better or worse oﬀ?
This paper studies the impact consolidation has on cable prices, bundle quality, ﬁrms’ cost
structure and consumer welfare using panel data for the cable television industry in Canada for the
1990-1996 period. This industry, time period and dataset are particularly conducive for studying
consolidation primarily for two reasons: (1) ﬁrms are licensed local monopolists in pre-deﬁned
geographic markets;2 and (2) over the sample period, I have access to rarely available supply-side
license-level data on ﬁrms’ labour costs, operating expenses and payments to channel providers
known as “aﬃliation payments”. The fact that ﬁrms are local monopolists yields two beneﬁts for
my empirical analysis. First, in order to expand into other markets ﬁrms must acquire other cable
companies, which yields many acquisitions in the data and rich within-license variation in ﬁrm size
and the identity of local cable providers. I use this variation to empirically study how acquisitions
and ﬁrm size aﬀect the prices, channel counts and ﬁrms’ costs of oﬀering cable bundles.
Second, the market structure allows me to use a structural multi-product monopoly model to
quantify the impact acquisitions, scale eﬀects and ﬁrm heterogeneity have on ﬁrms’ cost structures,
the menus of products oﬀered and consumer welfare. Developing such an analysis in a strategic
environment would be vastly more complicated since oligopoly models of strategic price and product
quality choice can be intractable for even a small number of ﬁrms. Importantly, I estimate the model
using license-level cost data that have not been available to previous researchers. I use this rich
information on costs to separately identify cable content costs (i.e., aﬃliation payments) from non-
content costs (i.e., labour and operating expenses), and for relating ﬁrms’ cost functions to oﬀered
cable prices and bundle quality.
After providing an overview of the industry and data in Section 2, I present the ﬁrst set of
empirical results in Section 3. They are based on a regression analysis that studies the within-
1Numerous articles document the history of consolidation in the U.S. cable television industry; see Parsons (2003)
for example. Byrne (2010b) documents the history consolidation for the Canadian cable television industry. For the
U.K. and Europe, see Wieten, Murdock, and Dahlgren (2000).
2Direct Broadcast Satellite enters the market in 1998 and cable companies start bundling cable with phone and
internet in 1999. Thus, cable companies are local monopolists in the provision of cable services who primarily earn
proﬁts by oﬀering a discrete number of tiered cable bundles (i.e., basic and non-basic cable) to consumers.
1license relationship between various outcome variables (cable prices, channel counts, aﬃliation
payments, market shares), acquisitions and the size of a license’s cable company in terms of the
number of subscribers served nationally. Acquisition and ﬁrm size eﬀects are predominantly found
in larger, urban markets where both basic and non-basic cable are oﬀered. Controlling for ﬁrm size,
I ﬁnd acquisitions have statistically signiﬁcant relationships with non-basic prices and aﬃliation
payments: non-basic prices and monthly per-subscriber aﬃliation payments respectively increase
by $3.12 and $1.48 following an acquisition. To the extent that higher quality channels (i.e., those
with higher ratings) are more expensive for cable companies to oﬀer (Crawford and Yurukoglu
(2010)), these estimates suggest cable quality rises with acquisitions. There is clear evidence of scale
eﬀects in the data, as ﬁrm size has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on all the outcome variables.
All else equal, large cable companies oﬀer lower prices, higher channel counts and realize lower
aﬃliation payments across all cable tiers. A ﬁve-hundred thousand subscriber increase (which is
the magnitude of the diﬀerence in ﬁrm size between dominant and small ﬁrms) in the size of a local
cable operator reduces basic and non-basic prices by $0.15 and $0.98, increases channel counts
by 0.42 and 1.09 and reduces non-basic aﬃliation payments by $0.71. Overall, the reduced-form
estimates suggest that acquisitions by large ﬁrms result in relatively small changes in basic cable
bundles and pronounced increases in non-basic prices and channel counts.
I further investigate the economic consequences of consolidation by developing and estimating a
structural multi-product monopoly model. The model is presented in Section 4 and an estimation
strategy is proposed in Section 5. In the model, consumers have heterogeneous vertical and hori-
zontal preferences over cable services. Firms know the distribution over consumers’ types but not
their individual types. To maximize expected proﬁts, cable companies screen consumers by oﬀering
tiered cable menus that contain basic services and possibly non-basic services. A key aspect of
the model’s speciﬁcation is that I allow for ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity in demand and
costs, which accounts for potentially important unobserved factors such as branding or managerial
diﬀerences across ﬁrms. I allow ﬁrm size to aﬀect marginal costs, which is consistent with regres-
sion estimates and the industry fact that larger cable companies tend to negotiate lower aﬃliation
payments with upstream channel providers.3 I estimate the model with a Simulated Method of
Moments estimator that compares the model’s predictions for basic and non-basic cable prices,
market shares, and non-basic per-subscriber aﬃliation payments to their empirical counterparts.
Section 6 presents the structural parameter estimates and various ﬁndings from three sets of
counterfactual experiments that investigate the impact consolidation has on cable bundles, costs
and welfare in acquired licenses. The estimates show that both ﬁrm heterogeneity and scale eﬀects
have a large eﬀect on ﬁrms’ demand, costs and proﬁt-maximizing menus of cable prices and qualities.
The ﬁrst set of experiments quantify the overall impact of consolidation by comparing the model’s
predictions for acquired licenses under the observed “consolidation” market structure to a “no-
3See for example, Ford and Jackson (1997) or Crawford and Yurukoglu (2010).
2acquisitions” counterfactual where no acquisitions occur between 1990 and 1996. Monthly per-
subscriber proﬁts rises on average by $1.49 in licenses with only basic cable and by $1.24 in licenses
with both basic and non-basic cable under consolidation. These represent 11.9% and 9% increases
over their no-acquisitions scenario averages. Consumer surplus is $0.39 higher across all licenses on
average, a 6.8% increase over its no-acquisition scenario level. Welfare inequality across consumers
rises under consolidation because higher demand consumers realize larger utility gains from higher
quality cable under consolidation than low demand consumers. In fact, not all consumers are better
oﬀ under consolidation. Consumers with suﬃciently weak preferences for quality can be worse oﬀ if
their utility gains from higher quality cable are more than oﬀset by their utility losses from higher
prices under consolidation.
I study the determinants of acquisition eﬀects by running a second set of experiments that start
from the no-acquisitions scenario and set one of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand eﬀects, ﬁrm-speciﬁc cost
eﬀects, or scale eﬀects to their consolidation levels. Comparing outcomes from these simulations
and the no-acquisitions counterfactual allows me to quantify the relative importance of demand
heterogeneity, cost heterogeneity and scale eﬀects in driving acquisition outcomes. I ﬁnd that
scale eﬀects are largely responsible for the diﬀerences in outcomes under the consolidation and
no-acquisitions scenarios. On average, monthly per-subscriber proﬁts in markets with basic and
non-basic cable and consumer surplus across all markets increase by $0.87 and $0.30 over their no-
acquisition levels if I only allow ﬁrm size to change with acquisitions. These changes are 71% and
77% of their total predicted changes between the consolidation and no-acquisitions scenarios. Firm
heterogeneity in costs also plays important role in driving consolidation outcomes: average proﬁts
and consumer surplus increase by $0.23 and $0.072 if only cost-side ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects change with
acquisitions. Branding eﬀects give rise to an average increase of $0.12 in monthly per-subscriber
proﬁts and have a minimal eﬀect on consumer welfare relative to the no-acquisitions scenario.
The ﬁnal counterfactual experiment evaluates the impact that regional consolidation has on
consumer welfare. By the mid 2000’s the industry is regionally consolidated with four major cable
providers dominating four distinct regions of Canada: Eastlink in Atlantic Canada, Vidéotron
in Québec, Rogers in Ontario and Shaw in Western Canada (Byrne (2010b)). I quantify the
welfare eﬀects from having regionally dominant ﬁrms by comparing outcomes under the 1996 market
structure to a counterfactual where only these dominant ﬁrms operate in their respective regions.
On average, I ﬁnd that monthly per-subscriber consumer surplus respectively increases by $0.65,
$1.07, $0.56 and $0.76 in each region under consolidation. Welfare gains are particularly large in
rural licenses where large ﬁrms’ ability to reduce costs and improve cable quality over the status
quo is the most pronounced.
31.1 Related literature
This study contributes to an active body of empirical research on the cable television industry.
Crawford and Shum (2006), Chu (2010), and Crawford and Yurukoglu (2010) have recently esti-
mated structural models for the U.S. cable television industry in the 1990’s and 2000’s that are
similar to the model I use.4 Respectively, these papers study quality degradation, the eﬀect of
satellite entry and the welfare implications of à la carte bundling of cable services. In contrast, I
focus on consolidation and linkages between ﬁrms’ cost structures and the menus of products and
prices oﬀered. Moreover, my empirical strategy uses previously unavailable license-speciﬁc cost
data on labour expenses, operating costs and aﬃliation payments to directly identify and estimate
ﬁrms’ cost functions.
This paper also complements a growing empirical literature in industrial organization that in-
vestigates the impact that mergers and acquisitions have on pricing and product variety and/or
quality in diﬀerentiated product markets. Berry and Waldfogel (2001) and Sweeting (2010) respec-
tively study horizontal mergers and product variety in the U.S. Radio Broadcasting industry and
U.S. Music Radio Industry. Both papers ﬁnd merging ﬁrms further diﬀerentiate their products
following a merger. Recent papers by Draganska, Mazzeo, and Seim (2009) and Fan (2010) develop
structural oligopoly models to study mergers and acquisitions with endogenous pricing and product
quality. Both papers conduct hypothetical merger simulations and show that diﬀerent conclusions
regarding the welfare impact of mergers can be reached depending on whether product quality is
assumed to be exogenous. Like the reduced-form papers, I empirically study the eﬀect observed
acquisitions have on prices and product quality. I complement the reduced-form analysis using
structural methods to examine the impact consolidation has on cable menus and consumer welfare.
The latter task is greatly simpliﬁed by studying acquisitions amongst monopolists: I do not require
a complex model of strategic price and quality setting that can contain multiple equilibria. Such
multiplicity potentially compromises the use of counterfactual merger simulations since predictions
over equilibrium outcomes are not unique. Moreover, the focus of this paper diﬀers considerably
from previous research in this area. I use demand and supply-side data to study the interrelated im-
pact acquisitions have on ﬁrms’ cost structures and product oﬀerings, whereas prior research focuses
on the competition-reducing eﬀects of mergers and acquisitions on prices and product quality.
2 Industry and data
Since 1968, cable companies in Canada have been federally regulated by the Canadian Radio-
television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), according to the Broadcasting Act (the
4Various earlier papers study how horizontal ﬁrm size and vertical integration aﬀects cable companies’ bundle prices
and characteristics, as well as their interactions with upstream channel providers in the U.S. cable industry. Both
Ford and Jackson (1997) and Chipty and Snyder (1999) ﬁnd evidence that horizontally integrated cable companies
realize cost eﬃciencies.
4Act). Prior to 2001, a primary feature of the Act is the issuance of geographical licenses from
the CRTC to cable operators that give companies exclusive rights to be the sole cable provider
within pre-deﬁned Local Service Areas (LSAs or licenses). Licenses are deﬁned by the CRTC and
typically correspond to cities, towns or municipalities. Prior to the entry of Direct Broadcast
Satellite in Canada in 1998, these exclusive licenses gave local cable companies monopoly rights
over the provision of cable services within pre-deﬁned areas. Licenses are renewable, deﬁned over
three to ﬁve year time horizons, do not involve fees and can be revoked by the CRTC.5
Cable companies earn proﬁts by oﬀering tiered cable bundles in the form of basic cable (including
the major broadcast networks like CBC, ABC, NBC and CBS), extended basic cable (including
CNN, ESPN or TSN in Canada), and pay/specialty cable packages (including HBO and The
Movie Network). The latter two tiers constitute ‘non-basic’ or ‘discretionary’ service, both of
which involve a tying requirement: subscribers must sign up for basic cable before purchasing any
packages from the non-basic tier. The price and channel composition of the bundles are subject
to basic price regulation, and channel carriage restrictions. For the purposes of this study, these
restrictions are eﬀectively deﬁned in the 1986 Cable Television Regulations, which represent a
substantial amendment to the Act. Basic price regulation puts an upper bound on the allowable
increase in basic prices from year-to-year.6 Carriage restrictions involve three primary components.
First, they contain “must carry” provisions that force cable companies to carry all local over-
the-air channels in their basic packages. Second, the CRTC licenses which channel providers are
allowed to transmit their signals to Canadian cable companies. Conditional on obtaining a license,
the CRTC then deﬁnes whether a channel can be oﬀered in the basic or non-basic tier. Thus,
the CRTC controls the universe of channels that can be oﬀered within cable tiers, while cable
companies choose what channels to oﬀer given these universal restrictions. Finally, Canadian
content provisions require that cable companies show a ﬁxed proportion of hours of Canadian-
based programming.7 Until 1999, cable companies’ primary source of proﬁts comes from their
cable services, after which Eastlink becomes the ﬁrst cable company in Canada to oﬀer telephone
service.8
Firm size, in terms of national subscribership, plays an important role in determining cable
companies’ channel costs. As noted above, various empirical studies of the U.S. cable television
industry ﬁnd larger ﬁrms are charged lower “aﬃliation payments” by channel companies. This is
because of vertical integration between large cable companies and channel providers and because
5Additional background of the history of regulation and technological change in the industry, as well as the
construction of the dataset can be found in Byrne (2010b).
6The upper bound on basic price growth is determined by the inﬂation rate, capital cost allowances, and whether
cable companies are in ﬁnancial distress. Licenses with less than 2000 subscribers are not subject to basic price
regulations so as to give cable companies an additional incentive to operate in smaller, rural areas.
7As of 2009, content rules require at least 60% of all programming between 6:00am and midnight be “Canadian
content”, and at least 50% of programming between 6:00pm and midnight be “Canadian content”, where “Canadian
content” is deﬁned by the CRTC.
8See http://www.eastlink.ca/about/history/index.asp.
5larger ﬁrms are in a stronger bargaining position in negotiating with channel providers. Larger
cable companies oﬀer more viewership for commercials, which is valuable to channel providers
since commercial fees are a key source of their revenue. Since aﬃliation payments directly aﬀect
costs per subscriber, ﬁrm size has a potentially large impact on cable companies’ cost structures.
Moreover, cost diﬀerentials amongst large and small ﬁrms can aﬀect pricing and channel bundling
decisions and the proﬁts that a large ﬁrm generates from a license relative to a small ﬁrm.
Scale eﬀects give rise to acquisitions in the cable industry. Large ﬁrms acquire small ﬁrms
in order to gain access to new licenses/subscribers and generate additional proﬁts beyond the
status quo. The CRTC recognizes this fact and formally deﬁnes its national policy with respect
to acquisitions in CRTC Public Notice PB89-109. The CRTC decentralizes the buyout process,
allowing collections of cable operators to propose acquisitions to the national regulator. These
exchanges are not competitive (i.e. there is no bidding for licenses) and the CRTC is explicit in
that it does not look for rival purchasers. The regulator evaluates transactions on a case-by-case
basis, putting the onus on the parties involved to show that a proposed acquisition “yields signiﬁcant
and unequivocal beneﬁts to the communities served.” The chief concern of the CRTC is that the
basic cable rates do not rise following an acquisition. Firms are free to alter non-basic package
prices and content. The predominant beneﬁt put forth by purchasing companies is the fact that
they can improve cable services (i.e., they can oﬀer more basic and/or non-basic channels) without
raising basic prices. I provide an example of a CRTC-documented decision that involve improved
channel oﬀerings in Figure 3 in Appendix C.
2.1 Data
The primary data sources are the CRTC Master Files for the 1990-1996 period.9 They contain
detailed information on ﬁrms’ revenues, costs, and subscribership at the license-year level of aggre-
gation and are further broken down by basic and non-basic services. The information contained
in these ﬁles is collected and veriﬁed by Statistics Canada on behalf of the CRTC. I use a subset
of the variables available including the prices, channel counts and number of subscribers for basic
and non-basic cable, the number of homes passed (i.e., the total number of people connected to the
local cablesystem) and total non-basic aﬃliation payments made from cable companies to upstream
channel providers. I also use annual cost data at the license level including total salaries and total
expenses for administrative and technical costs. I denote the sum of administrative and technical
costs as “operating” costs throughout. These costs capture the vast majority of non cable-content
related costs as reported in the Master Files.
The Master Files do not distinguish between subscribership and revenues for the extended
basic and specialty cable tiers. I therefore compute non-basic cable prices as average revenue per
subscriber for extended basic and specialty cable. Non-basic shares are the total share of market
9Stephen Law provided these data. They have been previously used in Law (1999) and subsequent papers.
6demand for the extended basic and specialty cable tiers. In short, I treat cable companies as oﬀering
low quality cable (basic) and possibly high quality cable (non-basic) throughout.
The second data source is the CRTC’s Decision and Notices archives. For each license, the CRTC
maintains searchable online archives for all license-ownership related decisions from 1984 onwards.10
Example decision ﬁles include new license applications, license renewals and revocations, as well as
acquisitions of cable companies. Using these decision ﬁles, I track the current cable operator for the
universe of 1262 licenses deﬁned in the Master Files over the 1985-2004 period. For each acquisition,
I record the acquisition date, the identity of the buying and selling ﬁrms, the licenses involved and
the transaction price (where available). Although the Master Files contain information on how
licenses are allocated across ﬁrms in a given year, it is important for my empirical results that
the exact timing of acquisition and entry decisions, as well as the ﬁrms and locations involved, be
accurately recorded. Further, the information contained in the Decision and Notice ﬁles identiﬁes
the subsidiaries of large cable companies that diﬀer by name from their parent company. The Master
Files often fail to distinguish subsidiaries from their parent companies. An example Decision File
is listed in Figure 3 in Appendix C.
I also use information from the 1991 and 1996 Canadian Censuses on the total number of
households, average household income, average age, average household size, the proportion of the
population with post-secondary education and variance in household income. License name identi-
ﬁers are matched to their corresponding Census Subdivision to obtain the above Census aggregates
at the license level. I use the 1996 Geosuite package from Statistics Canada to track location-
speciﬁc household counts and urban density, which are more accurate measures of local population
and urban density than that of a license’s Census Subdivision. Moreover, Geosuite provides data for
1991 household counts and urban density, correcting for diﬀerences in Census boundaries between
the 1991 and 1996 Censuses. For non-Census years, I follow Holmes (2010) and use a weighted
average of the 1991 and 1996 data. Speciﬁcally, the census variable xt for t ∈ {1992,... ,1995} is










x1996, and I set x1990 = x1991.
2.2 Estimation sample and summary statistics
I restrict my analysis to the 1990-1996 period because information on non-basic aﬃliation payments,
prices and subscription levels is not available prior to 1990. An added beneﬁt is that I can abstract
from complications related to the entry of Direct Broadcast Satellite in 1998. In particular, I can
develop and estimate a structural econometric model using a standard multi-product monopoly
framework to study the determinants of acquisition eﬀects, conduct welfare analyses and consider
counterfactual market structures such as complete regional consolidation.11
Table 1 highlights acquisition activity in the industry and amongst the ten largest cable com-
10The url for the Decisions and Notice archives is http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/dno.htm.
11Chu (2010) is the benchmark article on strategic interactions between Direct Broadcast Satellite and traditional
satellite providers. Many of my results and analyses complement his ﬁndings.
7Table 1: Acquisitions and Market Share of Largest Ten Companies: 1990-1996
Total Large Firms’ Total license Large Firms’ license Large Firms’ Large Firms’
Year Acquisitions Acquisitions Acquisitions Acquisitions Subscribership Licenses
1990 51 27 157 91 55.39% 21.58%
1991 36 15 58 32 60.69% 24.12%
1992 25 13 60 31 61.87% 25.72%
1993 21 9 31 18 66.16% 27.15%
1994 24 11 37 19 67.77% 28.34%
1995 36 23 175 152 82.60% 39.89%
1996 30 15 43 22 84.74% 41.08%
Total 223 113 561 365 - -
Notes: “Large Firms” correspond to the largest ten ﬁrms in Canada by national subscribership in 1996. These
ﬁrms are Rogers, Shaw, Vidéotron, Cogeco, C.F. Cable, Eastlink, Western Co-Axial, Persona, Winnipeg Videon and
Northgate Cable.
panies from 1990-1996 based on the universe of licenses and subscribership contained in the CRTC
Decisions and Notices and in the Census data. The largest ten ﬁrms are denoted “large” ﬁrms,
and are classiﬁed based on ﬁrms’ national subscribership in 1996.12 In total, there are 223 in-
stances where one cable operator acquires another, leading to 561 individual license acquisitions.
The largest ten companies out of 393 ﬁrms are responsible for 113 (51%) and 365 (65%) of all ﬁrm
and license acquisitions. The ﬁnal two columns of the Table 1 show how the acquisitions by large
companies results in an increase in their share of national subscribership and license ownership.
Over the sample period, national subscribership among the large ﬁrms increases from 55.39% to
84.74%, and the share of licenses owned nearly doubles from 21.58% to 41.08%.
After removing observations with missing data and dropping outliers, the resulting estimation
sample is an unbalanced panel consisting of 3723 observations that span seven years across 784
licenses. The sample includes 195 license acquisitions. Table 2 presents basic summary statistics
for markets where both basic and non-basic cable is oﬀered (“two-bundle” markets) and markets
where only basic cable is oﬀered (“one-bundle” markets). In one-bundle markets, 85% of consumers
sign-up for basic cable and pay $22.13 for 15 basic cable channels on average. Consumers in two-
bundle markets on average pay $19.14 for 21 basic cable channels and $31.65 for non-basic cable
which consists of 30 channels (21 basic plus 9 non-basic). Cable companies pay $7.43 per subscriber
per month on average in aﬃliation payments to upstream channel providers for their non-basic
cable services. In two-bundle markets, monthly non cable content related costs in terms of labour
and operating costs (technical plus administrative expenses) are $3.42 and $12.78 per subscriber,
respectively. The corresponding ﬁgures for one-bundle markets are $1.94 and $15.54 for one-bundle
markets, indicating that additional cable tiers involve additional labour expenses.
12The ﬁndings throughout are robust to the deﬁnition of “large” ﬁrms. Similar patterns emerge if I classify large
ﬁrms based on the largest 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 ﬁrms by national subscribership in 1996.
8Table 2: Estimation Sample Summary Statistics
Two-Bundle Markets One-Bundle Markets
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
CRTC Master Files Data
Basic Price 19.14 4.34 22.13 5.79
Non-Basic Price 31.65 10.76 - -
Basic Market Share 0.43 0.30 0.85 0.18
Non-Basic Market Share 0.38 0.29 - -
Basic Channel Counnt 21.15 6.06 15.20 5.44
Non-Basic Channel Count 8.49 6.59 - -
Per-subs. Aﬃliation Payment 7.43 6.29 - -
Per-subs. Labour Cost 3.42 6.29 1.94 2.62
Per-subs. Operating Cost 12.78 4.39 15.54 5.85
Number of Subs. 10438.76 21978.65 509.95 764.14
Homes Passed 12940.93 27361.34 613.45 915.21
Census Data
Average Household Income 40079.43 8074.56 37796.77 7625.09
Variance of Household Income 706232.70 802496.70 277348.60 191296.30
Urban Density 475.34 524.56 152.87 225.76
Number of Acquired licenses 163 32
Number of Observations 2808 915
Notes: All nominal amounts are in 1992 constant dollars. The unit of observation is a (license, year)
with the CRTC Master Files Data averaged over each month. “Per-subs.” is short for per-subscriber.
The market size and demographics data show that two-bundle markets are much larger, and
have higher average income, income volatility and urban density than one-bundle markets. The
average market size is 12,940 and 613 homes passed and urban density is 475 and 152 individuals
per square kilometre in two and one-bundle licenses on average. The bottom panel of Table 2
shows that roughly three-quarters of the observations and acquisitions in the estimation sample
come from two-bundle markets.
Table 3 presents means and standard deviations for the estimation sample based on whether a
license has two-bundles oﬀered and whether a license is currently owned by a large ﬁrm, as deﬁned
in Table 1. Comparing sample means across the two pairs of columns provides some initial evidence
that cable bundle characteristics and costs vary with ﬁrm size. Large ﬁrms oﬀer slightly lower prices
and more channels in their basic and non-basic bundles in both two- and one-bundle markets. The
diﬀerences in channel counts are pronounced, with large ﬁrms roughly oﬀering ﬁve more basic
channels in one-bundle markets, and two and ﬁve more basic and non-basic channels in two-bundle
markets. The fact that large ﬁrms oﬀer more channels at slightly lower prices likely explains part of
the diﬀerence in shares for large and small ﬁrms in two-bundle markets. In particular, 37% (46%)
and 44% (35%) of consumers respectively purchase basic and non-basic cable in two-bundle markets
9Table 3: Average Cable Package Characteristics, Market Shares, and Aﬃliation Payments for Large
and Small Firms
Two-Bundle Markets One-Bundle Markets
P-value of P-value of
Large Firms Small Firms t-test Large Firms Small Firms t-test
Basic Price 19.03 19.20 0.099∗ 20.95 22.21 < 0.01∗∗∗
(3.72) (4.64) (4.93) (5.84)
Non-Basic Price 31.12 31.93 0.058∗ - -
(11.54) (10.31) - -
Basic Market Share 0.37 0.46 < 0.01∗∗∗ 0.85 0.85 0.786
(0.30) (0.30) (0.14) (0.19)
Non-Basic Market Share 0.44 0.35 < 0.01∗∗∗ - -
(0.29) (0.28) - -
Basic Channel Count 22.16 20.61 < 0.01∗∗∗ 20.52 15.18 < 0.01∗∗∗
(5.83) (6.11) (4.76) (5.48)
Non-Basic Channel Count 11.52 6.89 < 0.01∗∗∗ - -
(7.46) (5.44) - -
Aﬃliation Payment 7.09 7.61 < 0.01∗∗∗ - -
(6.88) (5.95) - -
Number of Subs. 16496.94 7241.57 < 0.01∗∗∗ 412.08 516.94 0.309
(28901.25) (16368.37) (449.53) (781.49)
Homes Passed 20488.88 8957.51 0.124∗∗ 508.51 620.95 < 0.003∗∗∗
(36134.25) (20230.12) (564.26) (935.02)
Number of Observations 970 1838 61 854
Notes: Means for each variable are presented in each column with standard deviations in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. Large ﬁrms consists of the ten largest ﬁrms by national
subscribership in 1996. Small ﬁrms are those that are not classiﬁed as large ﬁrms. t-tests correspond to a test of equality
of the sample means for licenses served by large and small ﬁrms. All dollar amounts are in 1992 constant dollars.
operated by large (small) ﬁrms. Finally, the averages for per-subscriber aﬃliation payments for
non-basic cable in two-bundle markets is $0.52 higher in markets served by small ﬁrms. This ﬁnding
suggests scale eﬀects in non-basic bundle costs since larger ﬁrms realize lower marginal costs despite
oﬀering more channels in their non-basic bundles on average.
3 Regression analysis of acquisition and scale eﬀects
In this section, I examine changes in basic and non-basic prices, channel counts, shares and non-
basic aﬃliation payments around acquisitions in the data.13 The analysis is based on the following
regression equation that predicts a dependent variable (i.e., prices, channels, shares, aﬃliation
13Throughout this section, I focus on a subsample of licenses that do not experience a change in the number of
products oﬀered (i.e., locations that do not switch from one to two-bundle markets or vice versa) over the 1990-1996
period. In total, 18 out of 784 licenses experience such a change in the number of products oﬀered. None of these
changes correspond to an acquisition.
10payments), yℓkt, for license ℓ served by cable company k at time t:
ykℓt = β0 + β1Aℓt + β2Qkt + Xkℓtβ3 + Dtβ4 + FEℓ + ǫkℓt (1)
For each dependent variable, I separately estimate (1) for two and one-bundle markets. The
covariates of interest are a dummy variable Aℓt which equals one if license ℓ is acquired in year t
and all years thereafter, and the horizontal size of ﬁrm k in license ℓ in year t, Qkt.14 The vector of
controls Xkℓt include average household income, average age, average household size, the proportion
of the population with post-secondary education, urban density, the number of homes passed, and a
dummy variable equalling one if ﬁrm k is a multi-system operator. To account for year and location
unobserved heterogeneity, I include time and license ﬁxed eﬀects: Dt and FEℓ. The ﬁnal term, ǫkℓt,
is an idiosyncratic error term. Under this license ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation, the identiﬁcation of β1
relies on within license variation over time in basic and non-basic prices, channel counts, shares
and aﬃliation payments before and after an acquisition. Within license variation in the variables
of interest and ﬁrm size, which is mainly generated by acquisitions, is what identiﬁes β2.
3.1 Results
Table 4 presents the OLS estimates for β1 and β2 for each dependent variable using two sets of
covariates. Speciﬁcation (1) includes the acquisition dummy, the vector of license and ﬁrm-speciﬁc
controls, year dummies and license ﬁxed eﬀects. Speciﬁcation (2) adds cable operator ﬁrm size.
By comparing the results across the two speciﬁcations, I can assess the extent to which acquisition
eﬀects correspond to changes in the horizontal ﬁrm size of acquired licenses’ local monopolists.
The column (1) and (2) estimates in the top panel of Table 4 show basic prices and channel
counts are predicted to fall with acquisitions in one-bundle markets, however none of the estimated
eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant. The ﬁrm size estimates from speciﬁcation (2) suggest larger ﬁrms
tend to oﬀer more basic channels at higher prices, though only the estimate in the channel count
equation is statistically signiﬁcant. Interpreting the magnitude of the channel eﬀect, a ﬁve hundred
thousand subscriber increase in a license’s cable operator size (which is common for acquisitions
involving the largest ﬁrms in the sample) is predicted to yield 3.30 additional basic channels. There
is a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between acquisitions and basic market shares; shares are
predicted to rise by 5% with acquisitions.
The estimates in the bottom two panels of Table 4 contain β1 and β2 estimates for basic and non-
basic prices, channel counts and non-basic aﬃliation payments in two-bundle markets. Focusing
on the column (2) estimates, only non-basic prices have a statistically signiﬁcant relationship with
acquisitions. Acquisitions lead to a $3.12 increase in non-basic prices. The ﬁrm size coeﬃcients
for basic and non-basic prices and channel counts are all statistically signiﬁcant at conventional
14This speciﬁcation borrows from Sweeting (2010)’s regression equation.
11Table 4: OLS Estimates Relating Acquisitions and Firm Size to Prices, Channel Counts, Shares
and Aﬃliation Payments
One-Bundle Basic Prices Basic Channels Basic Share
Markets (N = 844) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Aℓt -1.003 -1.260 -0.205 -0.590∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.054∗∗
(0.782) (0.895) (0.332) (0.351) (0.024) (0.027)
Qkt (100,000’s) 0.441 0.661∗∗∗ -0.007
(0.337) (0.203) (0.012)
R2 0.113 0.115 0.477 0.481 0.063 0.064
Two-Bundle Basic Prices Basic Channels Basic Share
Markets (N = 2692) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Aℓt -0.407∗∗ -0.285 -0.206 -0.561 -0.016 -0.035∗
(0.186) (0.188) (0.332) (0.357) (0.019) (0.020)
Qkt (100,000’s) -0.029∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.037) (0.002)
R2 0.190 0.191 0.232 0.236 0.203 0.206
Two-Bundle Non-Basic Prices Non-Basic Channels Non-Basic Share Aﬃl. Payments
Markets (N = 2692) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Aℓt 2.297∗ 3.118∗∗ 1.481∗∗∗ 0.564 0.018 0.036∗ 0.880 1.476∗
(1.173) (1.282) (0.480) (0.495) (0.018) (0.019) (0.707) (0.763)
Qkt (100,000’s) -0.195∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗
(0.337) (0.203) (0.001) (0.048)
R2 0.054 0.056 0.482 0.496 0.204 0.207 0.058 0.062
Notes: Estimates obtained by OLS. Standard errors are listed in parentheses and are clustered at the license-level. ***,
**, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. Columns (1) and (2) correspond to
two. Speciﬁcation (1) includes time, license ﬁxed eﬀects and license-level controls for average household income, average
age, average household size, share of the population with post-secondary schooling, urban density, total population and a
dummy variable equalling one if the cable company operates in multiple licenses; Speciﬁcation (2) adds license-level controls
for ﬁrm size (subscribership across all licenses). All dollar amounts are in 1992 constant dollars.
levels. They suggest larger ﬁrms charge lower prices, oﬀer more channels and realize higher market
shares. The magnitude of the predicted acquisition eﬀects implied by the acquisition and ﬁrm size
estimates can be illustrated by way of example. Consider a hypothetical acquisition of the median
sized ﬁrm operating in a two-bundle market in 1993, AGI Cablevision, by its nearby dominant
ﬁrm, Shaw Cable. The acquisition and ﬁrm size estimates predict that such an acquisition leads
to $0.47 and 0.0003 decreases in basic prices and channel counts. The predictions for non-basic
services imply relatively large $1.82 and 2.03 increases in non-basic prices and channel counts.
The ﬁnal set of estimates in the bottom panel of Table 4 indicate statistically signiﬁcant re-
lationships between monthly non-basic per-subscriber aﬃliation payments, and acquisitions and
ﬁrm size. The estimates highlight opposing forces that potentially aﬀect non-basic channel costs
following acquisitions. Controlling for ﬁrm size, aﬃliation payments are predicted rise by $1.48 per
12subscriber following acquisitions. To the extent that higher quality channels are more costly to
cable providers (Crawford and Yurukoglu (2010)), this estimate provides additional evidence that
acquisitions lead to higher quality cable. Conversely, larger ﬁrms are predicted to realize lower af-
ﬁliation payments, which is evidence of scale eﬀects. For example, the ﬁrm size eﬀect alone reduces
aﬃliation payments by $0.94 per subscriber per month in the hypothetical AGI/Shaw acquisition.
The net eﬀect of the acquisition and size eﬀects predicts a $0.54 increase in aﬃliation payments,
which is less than 30% of the predicted non-basic price increase from an AGI/Shaw acquisition.
3.2 Endogeneity of acquisitions
If ﬁrms’ acquisition decisions are driven by the characteristics of target ﬁrms and/or their cable
menus, then the OLS estimates of β1 and β2 in Table 4 will suﬀer from selection bias. For example,
if large cable companies acquire small ones because small ﬁrms oﬀer poor non-basic cable services,
then the OLS estimates for β1 and β2 in the non-basic channel counts equation would be biased
upward due to selection eﬀects. In Appendix A, I provide two robustness checks that investigate
the impact endogeneity has on my reduced-form estimates for acquisition and scale eﬀects. Overall
the main conclusions from this section are generally unaﬀected by selection bias. There is some
evidence that selection is based on ﬁrm size in two-bundle markets: licenses served by relatively
smaller ﬁrms are more likely to be acquired. This selection aﬀects the magnitude but not the
direction of the estimated acquisition eﬀects.
4 Multi-product monopoly model
To evaluate the consumer welfare impact of acquisitions, and to investigate the importance of
branding eﬀects, cost heterogeneity and scale eﬀects have on cable companies’ cost structures and
cable bundles, I develop and estimate a multi-product monopoly model that captures basic features
of the industry.
4.1 Demand
The utility consumer i obtains from subscribing to cable bundle j oﬀered by cable company k in
license n is given by:
uijkn = tiqjkn − pjkn + X0
jknβ0 + ǫijkn (2)
where cable bundle quality and prices are respectively denoted by qjkn and pjkn.15 The other com-
ponents of the utility function include consumer i’s marginal utility for cable quality ti, non-cable
15For the sake of brevity in notation, I omit time subscripts throughout this section. The index n can be thought
of as a “license-year” observation in this section.
13content related factors that consumers value X0
jknβ0 (such as branding eﬀects), and consumer i’s
idiosyncratic utility for good j, ǫijkn. Throughout, I normalize the outside option utility to 0, which
pins down the level of utility is this discrete-choice set-up. The speciﬁcation assumes consumers
have a common degree of price sensitivity. In estimating and simulating data from the model, this
greatly simpliﬁes ﬁnding ﬁrms’ proﬁt-maximizing cable price and quality choices. I normalize the
coeﬃcient on prices to one, which deﬁnes the level of utility in terms of dollars throughout and
allows me to separately estimate the variances of the vertical and horizontal preference shocks.
Consumers’ marginal utility for quality are i.i.d draws from a normal distribution with license-
speciﬁc mean  n = X1
nβ1 and variance σ2
n = X2
nβ2. The horizontal preference are i.i.d Extreme
Value Type 1 distributed, with zero mean and scale parameter σ2
ǫ.
I use Jnk to denote the number of cable bundles oﬀered in market n by ﬁrm k such that
j ∈ {1...Jnk}. The menu of quality and prices for each bundle is denoted by {(pjkn,qjkn)}
Jnk
j=1.
Without loss of generality, I order package indices such that higher quality packages are indexed by
larger j values (i.e., qJnk is the highest quality cable package out of Jnk bundles oﬀered by company
k in market n). The tying requirement that basic cable must be purchased before an individual
buys non-basic cable ensures cable bundle quality can be ordered in this way.
Consumers choose the cable bundle that maximizes their utility. Conditional on an individual’s


















Denoting Qn total potential subscribers in market n, aggregate demand for bundle j is the market
share times potential market size: Qjkn = sjknQn.
4.2 Supply
Turning to the supply side, the marginal cost cost incurred by cable company k from oﬀering cable
bundle j in market n is speciﬁed as:
cjkn(qjkn,Qjkn) = Z0





jkn | {z }
content costs
(5)
14I distinguish between cable companies’ per-subscriber non-content related costs (i.e., labour and
operating costs) from their content-related costs (i.e., aﬃliation payments).16 Following previous
researchers, I abstract from ﬁxed aﬃliation costs and focus on the per-subscriber marginal costs
that cable companies and channel providers negotiate over. Cable quality qjkn can be thought of as
a hedonic index of the individual channels included in bundle j, where each channel is weighted by
a measure of popularity (such as television ratings). Previous research shows that higher quality
cable channels come at a higher marginal cost to cable companies (Crawford and Yurukoglu (2010)).
Therefore, I assume that c( ) is independent of the number of consumers in market n and is
increasing and convex in quality: c′( ) > 0, c′′( ) > 0. The curvature assumptions on c( ) are
standard for this class of screening models and ensure that an interior solution can be found (see
Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Bensanko, Donnenfeld, and White (1987)).
Beyond my lack of data on the identity of channels within bundles, Chu (2010) notes a secondary
motive for using a single quality index in computing ﬁrms’ per-subscriber costs: it greatly reduces
the dimensionality of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximization problem. Modelling the optimal bundling
choices of ﬁrms is a high dimensional problem since it involves choosing the optimal subset of
channels from the power set of all possible channel combinations. Although the dimensionality of
the problem can be handled in estimation using the moment inequality approach of Pakes, Porter.,
Ho., and Ishii (2006) (as employed by Crawford and Yurukoglu (2010)), it can be problematic for
conducting counterfactual simulations where the solution to ﬁrms’ optimal bundling problem must
be found.17 Using a single quality index thus greatly simpliﬁes simulating outcomes with the model.
Cable companies know the distributions for ti and ǫijkn, but not individuals’ vertical types or
horizontal preference shocks. Given a set of Jnk bundles with corresponding prices and qualities
{(pjkn,qjkn)}
Jnk








Firms choose their cable prices and bundle quality to maximize their expected proﬁts. I denote the





B, I outline how I calculate shares and the optimal prices and qualities. Note that the ﬁrms’
objective function abstracts from the discrete choice over the number of bundles to oﬀer. I do
not incorporate this choice as I rarely observe ﬁrms change the number of bundles oﬀered within
a license in the sample, irrespective of the local cable provider. Moreover, the number of cable
16In preliminary analyses of the data, I ﬁnd that labour and operating costs grow in constant proportion with the
number of subscribers within a license. There is little evidence to suggest that average labour and technical related
costs decline with market size or number of subscribers within a license.
17See Chu, Leslie, and Sorensen (2009) for recent work on handling dimensionality problems in bundling models.
They show simple pricing rules based on bundle size can serve as a good approximation to ﬁrms’ optimal bundling
decisions.
15bundles rarely change with acquisitions as well.
It is worth noting that I abstract from the eﬀect of basic price regulation, which as discussed,
restricts the year-to-year increases in basic prices. Two sets of ﬁndings from preliminary empirical
analyses suggests that basic price regulation has, at best, a weak eﬀect on oﬀered cable bundles.
First, the vast majority of year-to-year changes in nominal basic prices in the data is well below
the inﬂation-allowance permitted by the CRTC of 80% of a given year’s inﬂation rate. Second, the
inclusion of regulatory dummy variables for Class 1 and 2 licenses in regression equation (1) (without
the license ﬁxed eﬀects) yields statistically and economically insigniﬁcant eﬀects of regulation on
prices, channel counts and costs in Class 1 and 2 licenses relative to the unregulated Type 3 licenses.
5 Empirical implementation
This section outlines how I estimate the multi-product monopoly model. My estimation approach
diﬀers from the prior work of Chu (2010) and Crawford and Yurukoglu (2010) because I do not
have information on channel identity within cable bundles. Previous authors with access to channel
identity data in the U.S. develop estimation strategies based on ﬁrms’ optimal bundling decisions
or using bundle quality measures based on channel identities and television ratings data. On the
other hand, I have license-year level cost data on ﬁrms’ aﬃliation payments, labour costs and
operating expenses to estimate cable companies’ cost functions which governs price and quality
choices. Previous researchers who do not have disaggregated cost data identify cost functions using
aggregate data on average channel costs across all cablesystems in the U.S., or back out marginal
costs from pricing ﬁrst order conditions when only demand-side data is available.
5.1 Covariates
The non-content utility shifters in X0
jkn include a constant, a dummy for basic cable, year dummies
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc dummies for the eleven largest cable companies in terms of national subscribership
in 1995-1996.18 These covariates allow for persistent diﬀerences in non-content utility for basic and
non-basic cable, annual trends in demand and ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved eﬀects such as branding. I
include a constant, license-level measures of average household income and urban density in X1
n.19
I expect demand to be higher in markets with higher average income and lower in urban centres
where there are more alternatives to watching cable television. I allow the variance of vertical taste
18These companies include the “large” ten ﬁrms listed in Table 1 as well as MacLean Hunter which is a large
multi-system operator in Ontario up until it is acquired by Rogers in 1996. Allowing for ﬁrm-speciﬁc branding eﬀects
for all companies in the sample is infeasible because I do not observe enough license-year observations for smaller
ﬁrms to estimate their ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand eﬀects with the highly non-linear estimation routine.
19I have experimented with speciﬁcations that include demand shifters for average age, average household size
and educational attainment. These covariates increase the number of parameters to estimate without adding much
explanatory power. I therefore use a parsimonious speciﬁcation based on average income and urban density, both of
which have a well-identiﬁed eﬀect on consumer demand.
16shocks to vary with market size and observable consumer heterogeneity by including a constant
and license-year level measures of total population and variance in household income in X2
n. I take
a license’s potential market size, Qn, as exogenous and measure it as the number of homes passed.
The non-content marginal cost shifters, Z0
kn, include a constant, a basic cable dummy, the
logarithm of the number of subscribers a cable company serves nationally, urban density, average
household income, per-subscriber labour and operating costs in license ℓ, year dummies and ﬁrm-
speciﬁc dummy variables for the eleven largest ﬁrms. The content-related cost shifters, Z0
kn includes
the same variables as in Z0
kn with the exception of the demographic variables and per-subscriber
labour and operating costs. This speciﬁcation allows ﬁrm size to aﬀect the level and slope of the
marginal cost function at a diminishing rate. This captures potential scale eﬀects from negotiations
over aﬃliation payments with channel providers in a “reduced-form” fashion. The basic cable
dummy variable accounts for diﬀerences in promotional or services costs between basic and non-
basic cable. Urban density is expected to have a negative eﬀect on non-content related costs due
to economies of density. Finally, year and ﬁrm-speciﬁc dummies account for annual trends and
unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects in costs (such as managerial ability).
5.2 Estimation
I estimate the parameters of the model using a Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) estimator
that compares the model’s predictions for prices, shares and non-basic per-subscriber aﬃliation
payments to those observed in the data. In estimation, I account for endogenous quality choice,
but treat cable quality as unobserved to the econometrician. The predicted qualities adjust to
rationalize the prices, shares and aﬃliation payments that are observed in the data.
More speciﬁcally, I denote the model’s predictions for prices, shares, and (total) per subscriber
non-basic cost as p∗
jknt,s∗
jknt,c∗
2knt, j = 1,2. Recall that for a given parameter vector these are
obtained from solving the two-step optimization problem that maximizes total proﬁts (i.e., equation
(6)). The following H = 5 equations relates the model’s predictions to their empirical counterparts:
s1knt = s∗
1knt + us1knt s2knt = s∗
2knt + us2knt
p1knt = p∗




knγ0 + uc2knt (7)
The model’s P × 1 parameter vector is θ = {β0,β1,β2,γ0,γ1,γ2,ρ,σ2
ǫ}, which in total contains
P = 71 parameters. I collect the exogenous variables with the K × 1 vector Zi, where i ∈ 1...N
and i indexes license-years and N is the number of license-years. In total, there are K = 26
exogenous variables. Stacking the econometric errors, the H × 1 error vector for observation i is
denoted by ui(Zi,θ) = [us1knt us2knt up1knt up2knt uc2knt]′.
I estimate the model under the assumption that the prediction errors are orthogonal to the
17exogenous variables. By iterated expectations, I assume the following L = H × K = 130 moment
equations hold at the true parameter vector:
E[Z′
iui(Zi,θ0)] = 0 (8)
Building from the moment conditions in (8), the SMM estimator for θ is deﬁned as:














where Wi is a H × K block diagonal matrix where each diagonal element is wi = Zi, and
Λ is a L × L positive deﬁnite weighting matrix. I obtain an initial consistent estimate of θ
using Λ1 = [N−1 PN
i=1(W′
iWi)]−1. Using the ﬁrst-step estimate ˆ θ1, I compute the predicted
residuals from the model, ˆ ui(Zi, ˆ θ1) and use them to construct an optimal weighting matrix
Λ2 = [N−1 PN
i=1(W′
iˆ u(Zi, ˆ θ1)ˆ u(Zi, ˆ θ1c)′Wi)]−1, that I use to obtain an eﬃcient second-step esti-
mate ˆ θ2. To conduct inference, I compute standard errors for ˆ θ2 using the following estimator for
















where ∇θˆ ui(ˆ θ2) is the gradient vector of ˆ ui(ˆ θ2) with respect to θ evaluated at ˆ θ2. I discuss the
speciﬁcs in calculating and minimizing the SMM objective function in Appendix B.
5.3 Identiﬁcation
While the parameters jointly move to minimize the distance between the model’s predictions and
their empirical counterparts, for expositional purposes I discuss identiﬁcation of the demand and
supply parameters separately.
The demand-side parameters, {β0,β1,β2,σ2
ǫ}, are identiﬁed by the parametric assumptions on
the ti and ǫijkt distributions, the proﬁt-maximization assumption, variation in prices and shares, ex-
ogenous demand-side covariates, and exogenous variation in prices and quality arising from licenses’
local cost conditions. The mean of the vertical type distribution aﬀects the level of predicted prices
and market shares. Thus, variation in exogenous demand shifters (like average income) and prices
and market shares across license-years identiﬁes β1. The variance of the vertical type distribution
aﬀects the model’s predictions for substitution patterns among cable bundles; lower variability in
vertical types yields higher predicted price elasticities of demand. Using exogenous variation in
cable prices and shares due to diﬀerences in supply-size factors (such local wages and ﬁrm size),
I can determine the model’s predictions for demand responses to exogenous price changes. These
predictions in substitution patterns are compared to their analogues in the data to identify β2. Sim-
18ilarly, more variable horizontal taste shocks reduces consumers’ elasticity of demand with respect
to prices. Thus, σ2
ǫ adjusts to line up the model’s predictions over diﬀerences in shares within and
across licenses to exogenous (supply-side driven) variation in prices to their empirical counterparts.
The non-content cost parameters, β0, account for diﬀerences in the level of prices and shares across
years and licenses served by larger ﬁrms, after accounting for exogenous local demand and cost
shifters.
The supply side parameters, {γ0,γ1,γ2,ρ}, are identiﬁed by the proﬁt-maximization assumption,
variation in non-basic aﬃliation payments, exogenous supply-side content and non-content cost
shifters and exogenous variation in quality due to demand diﬀerences across markets. Firms’ non-
content costs are identiﬁed directly by the reported per-subscriber labour and operating costs as
collected by the Statistics Canada. Given a licenses’ labour and operating costs, the size and identity
of the local cable company and the model’s prediction for oﬀered cable quality, I can compute the
model’s prediction for non-basic aﬃliation payments. Thus, the marginal cost function (5) can be
traced out using data on non-basic aﬃliation payments, variation in labour and operating expenses
and exogenous variation in cable quality due to diﬀerences in excluded demand shifters across
license-years.
The optimization routine that minimizes the SMM objective function encounters convergence
problems if the baseline demand and variance parameters in β0 and β1 freely adjust with all the
other parameters. In estimation, I therefore restrict β01 = 8 and σ02 = 3.5 and estimate the
remaining parameters.20 I obtain these restrictions through an initial grid search under various
parameterizations that compares the model’s predictions for various moments of the price, market
share and cost distributions to those in the data. I have estimated the model under diﬀerent
normalizations and ﬁnd similar qualitative and quantitative results.21
6 Findings
The demand and supply side parameter estimates are presented in the left and right panels of
Table 5. On the demand-side, the year dummies do not suggest a clear trend in the demand
for cable. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc dummies provide evidence of branding eﬀects: the eleven large ﬁrms
deliver more non-content utility to households than smaller ﬁrms, with the exception of Rogers.
As expected, higher average income and urban density have a positive and negative impact on the
mean of the vertical type distribution and the demand for cable. Licenses with more homes passed
and higher variance in the household income distribution have vertical type distributions with
larger variances. The sample averages across license-years for non-content utility, and the mean
and variance of the vertical type distribution are $16.09 (s.d.=$0.38), $7.04 (s.d.=$1.28) and $3.56
20Previous authors estimate their models under similar consolidation normalizations on the vertical type distribu-
tion. Chu (2010) restricts the consolidation level of the shape parameter for the vertical type distribution.
21These results are available upon request.
19Table 5: Multi-Product Monopoly Model Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors
Demand-Side Estimates Supply-Side Estimates
Covariate Estimate Std. Error Covariate Estimate Std. Error
β0 Constant 15.8000 (0.3461) γ0 Constant 2.0000 (0.7156)
1990 0.0760 (0.2751) Log(Firm Size) -0.2110 (0.2449)
1991 -0.0700 (0.4130) Urban Density -0.0160 (0.1448)
1992 0.1410 (0.5196) Average Income 0.0850 (0.1679)
1993 0.2340 (0.4449) Labour Cost 0.6100 (0.1667)
1994 0.1810 (0.3731) Operating Cost 0.5550 (0.2299)
1995 0.4130 (0.5805) 1990 2.9950 (0.7106)
Rogers -0.0150 (0.2966) 1991 3.5980 (0.7599)
Shaw 0.2950 (0.3718) 1992 3.6340 (0.7696)
Cogeco 0.0030 (0.4175) 1993 0.4510 (0.7590)
Vidéotron 0.8020 (0.4747) 1994 0.5660 (0.8159)
Eastlink 0.0940 (0.7371) 1995 0.3670 (0.8228)
Persona 1.0720 (1.6148) Rogers -1.6870 (2.1019)
MacLean-Hunter 0.4510 (0.3255) Shaw -1.1390 (0.8542)
Videon 0.2300 (1.7534) Cogeco 0.1570 (0.5821)
C.F. Cable 1.0460 (0.8688) Vidéotron -0.6650 (0.4575)
Western Coaxial -0.8130 (0.5074) Eastlink -1.2540 (0.8236)
Fundy Cable 1.6960 (0.6102) Persona -0.8280 (1.5265)
Basic Dummy -0.9670 (0.0908) MacLean-Hunter -0.6360 (0.9331)
Videon -1.3390 (2.9782)
β1 Constant 8.0000 (0.1368) C.F. Cable -1.6070 (3.1498)
Average Income 0.8110 (0.0460) Western Coaxial -0.7830 (1.0463)
Urban Density -0.9640 (0.0556) Fundy Cable -0.9810 (1.3647)
Basic Dummy -1.0090 (0.0674)
β2 Constant 3.5000 (0.0826)
Homes Passed 0.0560 (0.0456) γ1 Constant 1.6550 (0.2271)
Variance in Income 0.1050 (0.0137) Log(Firm Size) -0.2270 (0.1848)
σ2














C.F. Cable -0.9520 (0.6424)
Western Coaxial -0.7320 (0.3037)
Fundy Cable -0.8800 (0.5172)
γ2 - 1.9140 (0.0816)
ρ - 2.4680 (0.0433)
Notes: Number of observations is 3723. All nominal amounts are in 1992 constant dollars. Average income
and income variance are de-meaned. Urban density, homes passed, and per-subscriber labour cost and
operating cost are divided by their sample means. Firm size is terms of 250,000 subscribers.
20(s.d.=$0.88).22 These compare to sample averages for predicted cable prices and quality across all
bundles of $1.40 (s.d=$0.86) and $23.33 (s.d.=$7.33). The estimated variance of the horizontal
taste shock distribution is $0.91, which is below the sample average of the vertical type distribution
variance. The sample average for the estimated own-price elasticity of demand for basic cable is
-4.39 (s.d.=2.01), which is comparable to estimates for the U.S. of -5.9 (Chipty (2001)) and -2.79
(Crawford and Yurukoglu (2010)).
On the supply-side, the estimated eﬀect urban density, average income and per-subscriber labour
and operating expenses have on non-content costs have their expected signs. There is a downward
shift in non-content and content costs between the early and middle part of the 1990’s. With
the exception of Cogeco, the estimated ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects in non-content costs suggest that the
eleven large ﬁrms are able to achieve lower non-content costs. Similarly, the estimates indicate
that unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity results in per-subscriber content-costs are systematically lower
for the eleven largest ﬁrms. The standard errors imply that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc content-cost eﬀects
are more accurately estimated than the non-content cost eﬀects. Firm size has a well-identiﬁed
negative eﬀect on both non-content and content costs. Thus, scale eﬀects also play an important
role in determining ﬁrms’ marginal costs and oﬀered cable bundles, which is consistent the basic
empirical patterns from sections 2 and 3. The sample averages for predicted monthly per-subscriber
non-content and content costs for basic cable are $3.43 (s.d.=$1.78) and $2.49 (s.d.=$1.92), and
$4.38 (s.d.=$1.78) and $8.72 (s.d.=$2.80) for non-basic cable. The average monthly per-subscriber
proﬁt levels of $12.33 (s.d.=$3.15) and $16.95 (s.d.=$3.90) for basic and non-basic cable. The
model predicts that cable operators realize large proﬁt margins in the estimation sample.
Recalling that I do not use an explicit measure of quality in estimation, it is important to check
if the model’s predictions over cable bundle quality correspond with some measure of cable quality
in the data. As a check, I present scatter plots of the model’s predictions for basic and non-basic
quality against observed channel counts in Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix C. The ﬁgures show that
higher predicted quality corresponds to more channels being oﬀered.23
6.1 The impact of consolidation
Using the estimated model, I measure the impact consolidation has on cable bundles, ﬁrms’ prof-
its and consumer surplus by simulating outcomes under three scenarios: (1) the “consolidation”
scenario, where market structure is set to what is observed in the data; (2) the “no-acquisitions”
scenario, where I assume no acquisitions occur between 1990 and 1996; and (3) the “no-quality”
scenario, where I constrain cable qualities to their predicted no-acquisitions levels, and allow ﬁrms
22Recall the normalization of the price coeﬃcient in the utility function implies all utility measures are in terms of
1992 constant dollars.
23Like Chu (2010), I have also estimated the model without horizontal preference shocks (i.e.: σn = 0) and similar
estimates and results throughout. These ﬁndings are available upon request. I therefore focus on the fully estimated
model in the results below.
21Table 6: Acquisition Eﬀects on Cable Bundles, Costs and Proﬁts
Two-Bundle Markets One-Bundle Markets
Consolidation No-Acqs. No-Quality Consolidation No-Acqs. No-Quality
Basic Price 17.07 16.68 16.76 23.75 23.11 22.95
(2.65) (2.46) (2.43) (1.92) (1.86) (1.92)
Non-Basic Price 31.01 30.42 30.03
(5.00) (5.09) (5.04)
Basic Quality 0.67 0.60 0.60 1.84 1.71 1.71
(0.39) (0.36) (0.36) (0.23) (0.21) (0.21)
Non-Basic Quality 2.35 2.23 2.23
(0.47) (0.49) (0.49)
Basic Share 0.491 0.489 0.463 0.837 0.829 0.847
(0.050) (0.054) (0.064) (0.038) (0.036) (0.043)
Non-Basic Share 0.419 0.417 0.449
(0.053) (0.056) (0.070)
Basic Marginal Cost 3.25 3.98 3.20 7.16 8.13 6.64
(1.92) (1.75) (1.92) (2.72) (2.26) (3.07)
Non-Basic Marginal Cost 11.36 12.19 10.60
(3.27) (3.23) (3.54)
Basic Aﬃl. Payment 1.21 1.39 1.17 4.73 5.16 4.20
(0.62) (0.67) (0.61) (1.03) (0.88) (1.46)
Non-Basic Aﬃl. Payment 8.32 8.59 7.55
(2.51) (2.66) (2.73)
Per-Subscriber Proﬁt 15.01 13.77 14.98 13.97 12.48 13.91
(2.77) (2.62) (2.77) (3.14) (2.44) (3.10)
Notes: All amounts are per-subscriber averages across all licenses and periods, and dollar amounts are in terms of
1992 constant dollars. Sample standard deviations are in parentheses. The term qN(ti) refers to the sample average
of Consumer Surplus at the N
th quantile of the vertical type distribution.
to optimally set prices under the consolidation market structure. By comparing predictions under
the ﬁrst two simulations, I can quantify magnitude of the overall impact of acquisitions. Comparing
the second and third simulations isolates the impact consolidation has on prices alone. Through-
out, I focus on consolidation eﬀects for licenses that acquired at some point between 1990-1996,
where both ﬁrm heterogeneity and scale eﬀects generate diﬀerences between the consolidation and
no-acquisitions outcomes.
Table 6 contains sample averages and standard deviations for the predicted outcomes under
each scenario, broken down by one and two-bundle markets. Comparing the second and third
columns shows that acquisitions yield higher priced and higher quality cable, provided at lower
costs in two-bundle markets. On average, bundle prices and qualities are $0.39 and $0.07 higher
for basic cable and $0.59 and $0.12 higher for non-basic cable under consolidation relative to the
no-acquisitions scenario. Marginal costs for basic and non-basic services are $0.73 and $0.83 lower
per month on average. Thus, cost-reductions arising from acquiring ﬁrms’ scale and ﬁrm-speciﬁc
22Table 7: Acquisition Eﬀects Consumer Welfare
Consolidation No-Acqs. No-Quality
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Mean CS 6.135 (1.117) 5.747 (1.066) 5.978 (1.087)
CS q10 1.605 (0.882) 1.637 (0.881) 1.712 (0.854)
CS q25 3.093 (0.431) 2.966 (0.417) 3.060 (0.415)
CS q50 4.886 (1.177) 4.575 (1.081) 4.694 (1.129)
CS q75 7.891 (1.943) 7.270 (1.878) 7.717 (1.841)
CS q90 12.679 (2.998) 11.775 (2.897) 12.285 (2.966)
Notes: All amounts are per-subscriber averages across all licenses and periods, and
dollar amounts are in terms of 1992 constant dollars. Sample standard deviations are
in parentheses. The term qN(ti) refers to the sample average of Consumer Surplus
at the N
th quantile of the vertical type distribution across license-years.
eﬀects are large enough to yield lower marginal cost despite higher quality being oﬀered under the
consolidation scenario. Average monthly per-subscriber proﬁts is $1.24 higher under consolidation,
a 9% increase over its no-acquisitions level.
Comparing the third and fourth two columns of Table 6, I ﬁnd that the no-quality experiment
results in $0.08 higher basic prices and $0.39 lower non-basic prices on average relative to the
no-acquisitions scenario. This highlights the conﬂicting impact acquiring ﬁrms’ demand-increasing
branding eﬀects, and cost-reducing scale and ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects have on cable prices. These
price diﬀerences lead to 0.026 lower basic shares and 0.032 higher non-basic shares under the no-
quality counterfactual. Thus, acquiring ﬁrms in two-bundle markets induce consumers to purchase
higher-priced non-basic cable by reducing its price relative to basic prices when they are unable
to adjust cable quality. Average monthly per-subscriber proﬁts are similar under the no-quality
and consolidation scenarios (respectively, $14.98 and $15.01). This suggests that acquiring ﬁrms’
ability to generate additional proﬁts through cost reductions and price adjustments can account for
a large share of the incremental proﬁts under consolidation irrespective of cable quality diﬀerences
in the consolidation and no-acquisitions scenario.
The results for one-bundle markets in the last three columns of Table 6 yield similar results.
Comparing consolidation to the no-acquisitions counterfactual, I ﬁnd on average that basic prices
and cable quality are $0.64 and $0.17 higher, marginal costs are $0.97 lower, and per-subscriber
proﬁts are $1.49 higher. Under the no-quality counterfactual, prices are $0.16 lower on average
relative to the no-acquisitions scenario. This highlights the importance of acquiring ﬁrms’ cost
advantages over their branding eﬀects in determining cable prices. If unable to adjust basic quality,
acquiring ﬁrms cut cable prices to induce demand, which can be seen by the 0.018 higher basic share
under the no-quality scenario. Similar to the ﬁndings for two-bundle markets, I ﬁnd that average
per-subscriber monthly proﬁts are comparable under the no-quality and consolidation scenarios
(respectively, $13.91 and $13.97).
23Table 7 contains sample averages and standard deviations across license-years for monthly mean
per-subscriber consumer surplus, and for per-subscriber consumer surplus at ﬁve quantiles of the
vertical type distribution. Across the three simulations, consumers realize a surplus of $6.14,
$5.75 and $5.98 per month on average. The diﬀerence in average consumer welfare between the
consolidation and no-acquisitions scenarios of $0.39 implies that acquisition-related increases in
cable quality yield increases in utility that more than oﬀset utility losses from higher prices on
average. The average diﬀerence in consumer surplus between the no-acquisitions and no-quality
scenarios of $0.23 suggests that consolidation generates welfare gains from large ﬁrms’ branding
eﬀects and price-reducing scale eﬀects irrespective of improved cable quality.
Comparing consumer surplus across the quantiles of the vertical type distribution in Table 7
highlights diﬀerences in welfare for consumers with diﬀering tastes for cable. Looking across the
columns shows that, with the exception of the 10th quantile, consumers are better oﬀ across all
quantiles under consolidation, followed by the no-quality and no-acquisitions scenarios. Consumers
at the 10th quantile are worse oﬀ by $0.03 per month on average under consolidation relative to the
no-acquisitions counterfactual. This suggests that subscribers with weak tastes for cable quality
do not realize a large enough increase in utility from higher cable quality to oﬀset the welfare-
reducing price increases under consolidation. Looking down the columns of Table 7 shows that
consumers with stronger tastes for cable quality realize considerably more surplus than those with
weak tastes. For example, consumer surplus at the 75th and 25th percentile of the vertical type
distribution is $4.80 and $4.30 higher under the consolidation and no-acquisitions scenarios. The
average diﬀerence in consumer surplus between lower and higher percentiles on the vertical type
distribution is larger under consolidation relative to the no-acquisitions scenario. Thus, inequality
in consumer welfare across high and low demand consumers increases under consolidation.
6.2 Scale eﬀects, heterogeneity and acquisition outcomes
This section presents results from three additional simulations, each of which is analogous to the
no-acquisitions counterfactual except either the ﬁrm-speciﬁc non-content dummies, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
non-content and content cost dummies, or ﬁrm sizes are set to their consolidation levels. I label
these simulations the “demand heterogeneity,” “cost heterogeneity” and “scale eﬀects” scenarios. By
analyzing the predicted changes in the model’s predictions between the no-acquisitions experiment
and each of these counterfactuals, I can assess the relative importance of ﬁrm heterogeneity and
scale eﬀects in driving acquisition outcomes in acquired licenses.
I present means and standard deviations for the simulated diﬀerences in cable bundles, costs
and proﬁts between the no-acquisitions scenario and the consolidation, demand heterogeneity, cost
heterogeneity and scale eﬀects scenarios in Table 8. Looking across the columns for two-bundle
markets, the magnitude of the changes are largest for the scale eﬀects simulation, followed by the
cost and demand heterogeneity simulations. The predicted changes in basic and non-basic prices of
24Table 8: Decomposition of Consolidation Eﬀects on Cable Bundles, Costs and Proﬁts by Demand
Heterogeneity, Cost Heterogeneity and Scale Eﬀects
Two-Bundle Markets One-Bundle Markets
Demand. Cost Scale Demand. Cost Scale
Consolidation Heterog. Heterog. Eﬀects Consolidation Heterog. Heterog. Eﬀects
∆ Basic Price 0.39 0.12 0.07 0.22 0.64 0.08 0.05 0.50
(0.90) (0.33) (0.16) (0.65) (0.81) (0.18) (0.07) (0.64)
∆ Non-Basic Price 0.60 0.05 0.13 0.37
(1.54) (1.06) (1.10) (1.38)
∆ Basic Quality 0.07 -0.00 0.02 0.06 0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.13
(0.14) (0.02) (0.03) (0.14) (0.16) (0.02) (0.02) (0.15)
∆ Non-Basic Quality 0.12 -0.01 0.03 0.09
(0.23) (0.14) (0.16) (0.23)
∆ Basic Share 0.003 -0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.008 0.003 0.000 0.005
(0.036) (0.028) (0.033) (0.034) (0.011) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007)
∆ Non-Basic Share 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.035) (0.029) (0.033) (0.035)
∆ Basic Marginal Cost -0.74 -0.00 -0.14 -0.57 -0.97 -0.04 -0.07 -0.86
(0.98) (0.04) (0.16) (0.83) (1.11) (0.08) (0.10) (1.02)
∆ Non-Basic Marginal Cost -0.83 -0.04 -0.15 -0.64
(1.22) (0.55) (0.61) (1.10)
∆ Basic Aﬃl. Payment -0.18 -0.00 -0.03 -0.12 -0.43 -0.04 -0.02 -0.36
(0.35) (0.04) (0.05) (0.29) (0.53) (0.08) (0.04) (0.47)
∆ Non-Basic Aﬃl. Payment -0.28 -0.04 -0.04 -0.19
(0.74) (0.55) (0.59) (0.72)
∆ Per-Subscriber Proﬁt 1.24 0.12 0.23 0.87 1.49 0.15 0.10 1.23
(1.75) (0.38) (0.28) (1.30) (1.74) (0.31) (0.15) (1.46)
Notes: All amounts are per-subscriber averages across all licenses and periods, and are in 1992 constant dollars. Sample standard
deviations are in parentheses.
$0.22 and $0.37 under the scale eﬀects counterfactual are 56% and 62% of their predicted diﬀerences
between the consolidation and no-acquisition scenarios. Similarly, the predicted increases in cable
quality and decreases in marginal costs for basic and non-basic quality are at least 75% of their
corresponding diﬀerences under consolidation and no-acquisitions. The eleven large ﬁrms’ ability
to reduce non-content and content cable costs through ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobservables also plays a
non-negligible role in determining acquisition outcomes. The fourth column of Table 8 shows that
relative to the no-acquisitions predictions, the ﬁrm heterogeneity scenario results in $0.02 and $0.03
higher basic and non-basic cable quality, $0.07 and $0.13 higher prices, and $0.14 and $0.15 lower
marginal costs. The third column shows that branding lead acquiring ﬁrms to increase basic and
non-basic prices by $0.12 and $0.05 on average, with little adjustment in cable quality and costs.
In one-bundle markets, scale eﬀects play an even larger role in determining acquisition outcomes.
This is because scale eﬀects diminish with in ﬁrm size, and acquisitions of one-bundle licenses
typically involve relatively smaller incumbents; recall from Table 3 that the national subscribership
25Table 9: Decomposition of Consolidation Eﬀects on Consumer Surplus by Demand Heterogeneity,
Cost Heterogeneity and Scale Eﬀects
Demand Cost Scale
Consolidation Heterog. Heterog. Eﬀects
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
∆ Mean CS 0.388 (0.583) 0.003 (0.156) 0.072 (0.198) 0.296 (0.505)
∆ CS q10 -0.032 (0.174) 0.010 (0.117) -0.016 (0.124) -0.040 (0.186)
∆ CS q25 0.127 (0.222) 0.013 (0.086) 0.018 (0.084) 0.086 (0.167)
∆ CS q50 0.311 (0.516) 0.011 (0.058) 0.057 (0.093) 0.237 (0.449)
∆ CS q75 0.622 (0.890) 0.009 (0.057) 0.119 (0.173) 0.483 (0.785)
∆ CS q90 0.904 (1.344) -0.021 (0.455) 0.181 (0.560) 0.703 (1.203)
Notes: All amounts are per-subscriber averages across all licenses and periods, and dollar amounts are in
terms of 1992 constant dollars. Sample standard deviations are in parentheses. The term CS qN(ti) refers
to the sample average of Consumer Surplus at the N
th quantile of the vertical type distribution.
of ﬁrms serving one-bundle markets is considerably smaller than those serving two-bundle markets
on average. Scale diﬀerences between acquiring and selling ﬁrms in these markets therefore have
relatively larger marginal eﬀects on acquisition outcomes than acquisitions amongst larger ﬁrms
in two-bundle markets. The last column of Table 8 illustrates this result as the average predicted
$0.50 and $0.13 increases in basic prices and cable quality and $0.36 decrease in marginal costs are
at least 78% of their respective diﬀerences under the consolidation and no-acquisition scenarios.
The sample averages and standard deviations across license-years for the change in mean con-
sumer surplus at ﬁve quantiles of vertical type distribution are listed in Table 9. The scale eﬀects
counterfactual yields the largest average change in mean consumer surplus of $0.296 per-subscriber
per month (76% of the predicted diﬀerence between the consolidation and no-acquisitions scenar-
ios.), followed by average changes of $0.072 and $0.003 under the cost and demand heterogeneity
simulations. Similarly, the magnitude of the average predicted changes in consumer welfare across
the quantiles of the vertical type distribution are largest under the scale eﬀects simulation.
6.3 Regional consolidation and consumer welfare
By the mid 2000’s, the industry has four regionally dominant ﬁrms: Eastlink in Atlantic Canada,
Vidéotron in Québec, Rogers in Ontario and Shaw in Western Canada (Byrne (2010b)).24 In this
section, I estimate the welfare changes arising from regional consolidation by comparing consumer
surplus under the 1996 market structure to a counterfactual scenario where the four major regions
24The CRTC acknowledges this fact in 2001 when it replaces the existing disaggregated licensing scheme with a
regional approach that requires ﬁrms to hold one license for all of their Class 1, Class 2 and Type 3 licenses across
these distinct regions of Canada; see CRTC Public Notice 2001-59. In implementing this new policy, the CRTC
deﬁnes ﬁve regions: Region 1: British Columbia, the Yukon, Nunavut, the Northwest Territories; Region 2: Alberta,
Saskatchewan, and Manitoba; Region 3: Ontario; Region 4: Québec; Region 5: New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince
Edward Island and Newfoundland.
26are solely run by Eastlink, Vidéotron, Rogers and Shaw.25 While these simulations ignore the
subsequent eﬀects of satellite entry and the internet, they provide a sense of the magnitude of the
welfare impact of regional consolidation. To the extent that satellite entry causes cable companies
to reduce prices and raise quality across cable tiers (as Chu (2010) overwhelmingly ﬁnds to be the
case), these results provide a lower bound on the welfare impact of consolidation.
Table 10 contains sample averages and standard deviations for monthly mean per-subscriber
consumer surplus across all licenses and for four subsets of licenses based on the quartiles of the
urban density distribution within each region under the 1996 and regional consolidation market
structures. The average increase in mean consumer surplus under regional consolidation ranges
from $1.07 in Québec to $0.65 in the Atlantic region. The relatively large average gains in Québec
arise because many small local cable operators exist in the rural parts of province in 1996. The
introduction of a large ﬁrm such as Vidéotron to these rural licenses implies large potential welfare
gains due to scale and ﬁrm heterogeneity eﬀects.
The average consumer surplus diﬀerences across the intervals of the urban density distribution
for the four regions show that licenses with lower urban density stand to realize the largest potential
gains from consolidation. For example, in Western Canada licenses lying between and 0 and 25th
percentile of the urban density distribution realize an average increase of $1.25 in monthly per-
subscriber surplus under regional consolidation. This is nearly three times the $0.45 welfare gain
for urban licenses in the 75-100 interval within this region. Across all four regions, welfare gains
are largest for either the 0-25 or 25-50 intervals. This is because large cable operators tend to
operate in urban licenses and not rural ones in 1996. As the dominant companies spread into
increasingly rural parts of Canada in the 2000’s, they bring their scale advantages, ﬁrm-speciﬁc
branding eﬀects and cost reductions from ﬁrm-speciﬁc competencies such as managerial experience
in running cablesystems. This allows larger acquiring ﬁrms to oﬀer higher quality cable services
and charge prices that consumers are willing to pay.
7 Conclusion
This article empirically studies the economic consequences of consolidation in the Canadian cable
television industry. The analysis uses complementary reduced-form and structural approaches
to evaluate acquisition eﬀects and investigate outcomes under counterfactual market structures.
I ﬁnd acquisitions of smaller cable companies by large ones results in higher priced and higher
25There are some exceptions to this characterization of market structure worth noting. Rogers is dominant in
New Brunswick and Newfoundland, while Eastlink owns almost all of the licenses in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward
Island. Cogeco also has a strong presence in Eastern Ontario and throughout Québec. I do not incorporate these
particulars of market structure in this section as I mainly aim to quantify the magnitude of the impact regional
consolidation has on consumer welfare. To the extent that scale eﬀects result in welfare gains for consumers due to
improved cable bundles, I will underestimate consolidation eﬀects for licenses served by Rogers in New Brunswick
and Newfoundland and overestimate them for licenses served by Cogeco in Québec and Ontario.
27Table 10: The Eﬀect of Regional Consolidation on Consumer Surplus
Regional 1996 Market CS
Consolidation Structure Diﬀerence
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Atlantic (Eastlink)
Mean CS 6.989 (0.798) 6.342 (0.834) 0.647 (0.510)
CS q0-25 7.562 (0.622) 7.014 (0.857) 0.548 (0.492)
CS q25-50 7.441 (0.649) 6.539 (0.727) 0.902 (0.516)
CS q50-75 6.708 (0.504) 6.161 (0.445) 0.547 (0.531)
CS q75-100 6.229 (0.595) 5.626 (0.592) 0.603 (0.452)
Québec (Vidéotron)
Mean CS 6.866 (0.856) 5.797 (0.746) 1.069 (0.478)
CS q0-25 7.270 (0.696) 5.973 (0.664) 1.297 (0.283)
CS q25-50 7.363 (0.605) 6.105 (0.623) 1.258 (0.356)
CS q50-75 6.939 (0.565) 5.958 (0.678) 0.981 (0.537)
CS q75-100 5.894 (0.651) 5.154 (0.635) 0.740 (0.480)
Ontario (Rogers)
Mean CS 6.457 (1.439) 5.893 (1.379) 0.563 (0.537)
CS q0-25 7.518 (0.660) 6.655 (0.855) 0.863 (0.545)
CS q25-50 7.516 (0.876) 6.870 (1.067) 0.646 (0.573)
CS q50-75 6.026 (0.607) 5.616 (0.822) 0.410 (0.487)
CS q75-100 4.724 (1.145) 4.394 (1.127) 0.330 (0.377)
West (Shaw)
Mean CS 6.969 (1.106) 6.208 (0.990) 0.761 (0.612)
CS q0-25 8.137 (0.742) 6.890 (0.655) 1.247 (0.421)
CS q25-50 7.034 (0.659) 6.153 (0.731) 0.881 (0.543)
CS q50-75 6.492 (0.521) 6.039 (0.628) 0.453 (0.551)
CS q75-100 6.178 (1.208) 5.731 (1.382) 0.447 (0.547)
Notes: All amounts are per-subscriber averages across all licenses and periods, and dollar
amounts are in terms of 1992 constant dollars. Sample standard deviations are in paren-
theses. The term CS qN −N
′ refers to the sample average of Consumer Surplus for licenses
whose urban density is between the N and N
′ quartiles of the urban density distribution
across licences in 1996.
quality non-basic cable, delivered at a lower costs, with relatively smaller changes in basic cable
bundles. Consumers welfare rises on average with acquisitions, suggesting the utility losses from
price increases are more than oﬀset by the utility gains from having higher quality cable services.
A decomposition of the determinants of acquisition outcomes shows that cost-reducing scale eﬀects
are the primary driver of consolidation eﬀects, while demand and cost heterogeneity have a smaller,
yet important role. Finally, I conduct an experiment to evaluate regional consolidation, like that
observed by the mid-2000’s in Canada. I ﬁnd that consumers are generally better oﬀ being served
by dominant cable companies, particularly in rural parts of the country where the potential for
cable quality improvements and cost reductions is the largest.
28There are at least two avenues of future research worth noting. I have focused on consolidation
during an earlier period for the cable industry because of the empirical convenience of studying
local monopolies and the accessibility of rarely available cost data. It would be interesting to study
consolidation eﬀects during more contemporary times, where Direct Broadcast Satellite and tele-
phone companies are direct competitors to traditional cable companies. If consumer switching costs
amongst cable providers persist (Shcerbakov (2009)), then large cable companies have recently had
an additional incentive beyond scale and ﬁrm-speciﬁc reasons to acquire other ﬁrms and penetrate
new markets prior to the entry of new competitors. Second, I have taken ﬁrms’ acquisition deci-
sions as exogenous. Constructing an econometric model of endogenous prices, product quality and
acquisitions is a very challenging exercise that is well beyond the scope of this paper. Estimating
models of endogenous acquisitions is a current research frontier that permits further analyses of
the determinants of consolidation in the cable television industry, as well as other industries. This
is an area of research that I am currently pursuing (Byrne (2010a)).
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31SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX
A Endogeneity of acquisitions
As a ﬁrst check on potential endogeneity in the reduced-form estimates of merger eﬀects from Sec-
tion 3, I compare the pre-merger characteristics of acquired licenses to non-acquired licenses prior
to acquisitions to see if there are systematic diﬀerences in the types of licenses that are acquired.26
Using the sample of all non-acquired licenses and pre-merger observations for all acquired licenses,
I regress a given license-level characteristic on a dummy variable that equals one if a license is sub-
sequently acquired. If the coeﬃcient estimate on the acquisition dummy is statistically signiﬁcant,
then the dependent variable for acquired licenses systematically diﬀers from non-acquired licenses.
I present the results from these regressions for one and two-bundle markets in Table 11, where the
dependent variables are basic and non-basic prices, channel counts and shares, as well as horizontal
ﬁrm size (national subscribership) of a license’s current cable company.27 For one-bundle markets,
the only statistically signiﬁcant estimate is for basic shares (at the 1% level), suggesting that ac-
quiring ﬁrms potentially target one-bundle markets with low-demand. For two-bundle markets,
only the regression where ﬁrm size is the dependent variable delivers a statistically signiﬁcant re-
sult (at the 5% level). The coeﬃcient estimate suggests that two-bundle markets served by smaller
ﬁrms are more likely to be acquired, which reﬂects the fact from Table 1 that the dominant ﬁrms
are involved in the majority of acquisitions. There do not appear to be systematic diﬀerences in
acquired licenses based on the characteristics of the current cable bundles since as other estimates
are statistically insigniﬁcant.
As another check on endogeneity, I re-estimate equation (1) using sub-samples of the data that
vary the extent to which selection eﬀects matter. For example, acquisitions involving the dominant
ﬁrms may be more inﬂuenced by selection eﬀects as scale eﬃciencies may allow larger companies
to oﬀer more lucrative bundles that potentially earn higher proﬁts. I continue to classify a ﬁrm
as “large" if it is one of the ten largest cable companies in 1996 by national subscribership. I re-
estimate equation (1) for two-bundle markets using two subsamples that respectively exclude small
and large ﬁrm acquisitions.28 The results are listed in Table 12. Comparing the top and bottom
panels, I ﬁnd qualitatively similar results for the two sets of estimates, implying that to the extent
that scale-based selection eﬀects exist, they are not driving the general conclusions of my reduced-
form analysis. The results do suggest that scale-based selection eﬀects may put upward pressure on
the magnitude of the acquisition coeﬃcients for non-basic prices, channels and aﬃliation payments
in Table 4.
26The two merger endogeneity checks in this appendix follow Sweeting (2010)’s approach.
27I include time dummies and the ﬁrm and demographic controls from above in the regressions, and replace the
license ﬁxed eﬀects with province ﬁxed eﬀects.
28I do not list results for one-bundle markets as there are no acquisitions of one-bundle markets by large ﬁrms as
I have deﬁned them. This is because one-bundle market acquisitions typically involve rural cablesystems that larger
ﬁrms do not actively acquire.
32Table 11: Tests of Whether Acquired licenses are Representative
Basic Non-Basic Basic Non-Basic Basic Non-Basic Firm
Price Price Channels Channels Share Share Size
One-Bundle
Markets (N = 680)
Coeﬃcient on -0.697 - -0.252 - -0.102∗∗∗ - -0.001
license ever acquired (1.109) - (0.802) - (1.039) - (0.069)
Two-Bundle
Markets (N = 1910)
Coeﬃcient on -0.263 -0.283 0.476 -0.424 -0.001 -0.028 -0.901∗∗
license ever acquired (0.448) (0.853) (0.500) (0.453) (0.027) (0.025) (0.374)
Notes: Estimates obtained by OLS. Standard errors are listed in parentheses and are clustered at the license-level. ***,
**, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. The speciﬁcation is analogous to
Speciﬁcation (2) from Table 4, expect the license ﬁxed eﬀects are replace with province dummies. All nominal amounts
are in 1992 constant dollars.
Table 12: Estimation Results by Large and Not Large Buying Firms in Two-Bundle Markets
Basic Non-Basic Basic Non-Basic Basic Non-Basic Aﬃliation
Price Price Channels Channels Share Share Payments
Exclude Small Acquiring
Firms (N = 2664)
Alt -0.458∗∗∗ 3.771∗∗∗ -1.733 4.260∗ -0.058∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 1.723∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.534) (2.055) (2.310) (0.023) (0.022) (0.360)
Exclude Large Acquiring
Firms (N = 1926)
Alt -0.444∗∗ 2.274∗ -0.132 1.348∗∗∗ -0.014 0.014 0.851
(0.196) (1.231) (0.336) (0.490) (0.020) (0.019) (0.742)
Notes: Estimates obtained by OLS. Standard errors are listed in parentheses and are clustered at the license-level. ***, **,
* indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. The speciﬁcation is analogous to Speciﬁcation
(2) from Table 4. A ﬁrm is classiﬁed as large if it operates in ten or more licenses in 1996. All nominal amounts are in 1992
constant dollars.
33B Computational details
I numerically evaluate the integral that deﬁnes each cable bundle’s market share, deﬁned in equation
(4), using 200 draws from a Halton sequence with a diﬀerent prime number seed for each license-
year. As noted by Train (2003), Halton sequences have substantially better coverage properties
than machine-generated pseudo random number generators, which reduces the variance of the
shares estimates. By using fewer draws, I also reduce the computational cost in simulating vectors
of shares for each observation.




j=1}, the qualities and prices that maximize
expected proﬁts (equation (6)). Since non-basic cable prices and quality are restricted to be higher
than basic cable prices and quality, this simpliﬁes ﬁnding the optimal prices and qualities. I have
experimented with many starting values for many parameterizations of the model and ﬁnd the
same proﬁt maximizing price and quality vectors across license-years.
Calculating the SMM objective function is a computationally intensive task since it involves
solving N non-linear optimization problems (i.e., ﬁnding (p∗
jkn,q∗
jkn) for each observation). Since
I can independently compute s∗,p∗,c∗
2 across licenses and time, I parallelize my code which allows
me to perform these license-year level computations on multiple processors simultaneously. This
substantially speeds up computation of the SMM objective function. One SMM objective function
evaluation in MATLAB takes approximately 140 seconds when using 8 Xeon X5620 processors
simultaneously with 24 GB of RAM. I minimize the SMM objective function using the Diﬀerential
Evolution global optimization routine (Storn and Price (1997)).
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35Figure 3: CRTC Decision 89-46
Decision 
Ottawa, 14 February 1989 
Decision CRTC 89-46 
Adelaide Radio & T.V. Limited 
St. Mary's, Ontario - 882794100 
Pursuant to Public Notice CRTC 1988-212 dated 22 December 
1988, the Commission approves the application for authority to 
transfer effective control of Adelaide Radio & T.V. Limited, licensee 
of the broadcasting receiving undertaking serving St. Mary's, 
through the transfer of all of the common voting shares from the 
existing shareholders (the Tipping family) to Rogers Cable T.V. 
Limited (Rogers). 
Rogers has proposed to purchase 100% of the shares of Adelaide 
Radio & T.V. Limited for the purchase price of $600,000. Based on 
information filed with the application, the Commission has no 
concerns with respect to the availability or adequacy of the 
required financing. 
Rogers is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Canadian Cablesystems 
Limited, which in turn, is indirectly and ultimately controlled by Mr. 
Edward Rogers of Toronto. 
Through various companies, Mr. Rogers owns CFTR and CHFI-FM 
Toronto and eight cablesystems in Ontario, one in Alberta and five 
in British Columbia. Mr. Rogers also holds a 25.4% interest in YTV 
Canada Inc., the youth-oriented specialty service; a 74.2% 
interest in the multilingual station CFMT-TV and a majority interest 
in the Canadian Home Shopping Network (CHSN) Ltd., a non- 
programming cable service. 
As stated in a number of decisions relating to applications for 
authority to transfer ownership or effective control of broadcasting 
undertakings, and because the Commission does not solicit 
applications for such transfers, the onus is on the applicant to 
demonstrate to the Commission that the application filed is the 
best possible proposal under the circumstances, taking into 
account the Commission's general concerns with respect to 
transactions of this nature. 
The Commission reaffirms that the first test any applicant must 
meet is that the proposed transfer of ownership or control yields 
significant and unequivocal benefits to the communities served by 
the broadcasting undertaking, to the Canadian broadcasting 
system as a whole, and that it is in the public interest. 
In particular, the Commission must be satisfied that the benefits, 
both those that can be quantified in monetary terms and others 
which may not easily be measurable in terms of their dollar value, 
are commensurate with the size of the transaction and that they 
take into account the responsibilities to be assumed, the 
characteristics and viability of the broadcasting undertakings in 
question, and the scale of the programming, management, 
financial and technical resources available to the purchaser. 
In assessing this application, the Commission has taken into 
consideration Rogers' commitment to provide St. Mary's with a 
level of cable service equivalent to that of the neighbouring Grand 
River system. Also, Rogers intends to extend the company's 
service hours thereby decreasing response time for service calls 
and improving accessibility to the cable company. The Commission 
also notes the extensive experience and resources upon which the 
purchaser may draw in order to maintain and improve service to 
subscribers.
In evaluating the benefits to be derived from this transaction, the 
Commission has taken into account that Rogers has committed to 
spend $568,000 to improve technical services $500,000 of which 
may be recovered through rate applications filed under subsection 
18(6) of the Cable Television Regulations, 1986 (the regulations). 
In this respect, Rogers has committed to spend approximately 
$120,000 for improvements in the St. Mary's signal package by 
including in the channel line-up Canadian specialty services and 
FM services not currently available. Further, in this regard, Rogers 
has undertaken to rebuild the system in order to increase capacity 
on the basic service from 15 to 29 channels. The estimated capital 
cost of this proposal is $380,000. 
Although an application to recover these capital expenditures 
which represent about $500,000 may be filed under subsection 
18(6) of the regulations, the Commission notes Rogers' 
commitment that the basic monthly fee at St. Mary's will be no 
more than the authorized rate for the adjacent Grand River 
system. 
Having examined the financial situation of the current licensee, the 
Commission notes that Adelaide Radio & T.V. Limited has 
experienced declining rates of returns on net fixed assets and, in 
this regard, considers that the licensee appears unable at present 
to finance basic on-going maintenance programs and would have 
difficulty financing the extensive capital improvements that will be 
necessary in the future. 
In light of the foregoing, the Commission considers that these 
expenditure commitments will benefit St. Mary subscribers. 
In addition, the purchaser has proposed quantifiable benefits 
totalling $68,000 that will accrue to subscribers through technical 
improvements and other programming and operating 
expenditures. 
Specifically, Rogers will introduce by September 1989 full-service 
community programming that will, among other things, provide 
coverage of St. Mary's town council meetings. Also, Rogers will 
incorporate a descrambling system enabling subscribers greater 
flexibility in the selection of discretionary services. 
The Commission has therefore concluded that the benefits, both 
intangible and quantifiable, are commensurate with the size of the 
transaction, the viability of the undertaking in question, the 
responsibilities involved and the resources available to the 
purchaser. In view of all the foregoing and having examined the 
information available to it, the Commission is satisfied that the 
proposed transfer of control will yield significant benefits to cable 
subscribers in St. Mary's and that approval of the application is in 
the public interest. 
The Commission acknowledges the intervention received from Mr. 
Chris West in support of this application. 
Fernand Bélisle 
Secretary General
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